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private-partnership (PPP) approaches. Among them, the use of 
concession contracts awarded for the building and maintenance 
of toll highways—which have a long tradition in the Spanish legal 
framework to encourage private companies to participate in the 
design, construction, maintenance, and operation of toll highways—
was widespread. This approach was based on transferring most of 
the risk (costs of land expropriation, construction, traffic revenues, 
interest rate, and other financial risks) to the private sector. From the 
beginning, highway concessions in Spain were competitively awarded 
to private consortia through competitive tenders. This practice is 
substantially different from the situation in other European countries 
such as France and Italy, which directly entrusted toll highways to 
public–private companies mainly controlled by the government.
The objective of this study is threefold. First, the consequences 
of the economic recession that struck Spain beginning in 2008 on 
the outcome of the concession contracts are assessed, especially 
on traffic levels and the requirements imposed by financial institu-
tions for providing project finance loans. Second, the weaknesses of 
the Spanish toll highway concession approach are analyzed, which 
became apparent as a consequence of the economic recession and 
the financial crisis. Third, the current trends in both Spain and 
Europe toward a greater role for the public sector in mitigating risk 
in PPP contracts and supporting big PPP deals through guarantees 
and subordinated debt are described.
Toll HigHway ConCessions in spain
Historical evolution
Toll highway concessions in Spain have a long track record. Three 
different periods regarding the implementation of highway conces-
sions in Spain can be distinguished: 1967 to 1975, 1976 to 1995, and 
1996 to the present (1).
Between 1967 and 1975, 2,042 km of toll highways was built 
by the central government of Spain. A toll highway program was 
started as a means of expanding and improving the Spanish highway 
network because the Spanish state was not able to afford such a huge 
investment. Private funding was the only means available to reach 
that goal (1, 2).
The second stage dates from 1976 to 1995. In this period, no 
highway concession was awarded. The Socialist government, which 
took office in 1982 and remained in power until 1996, was politically 
opposed to promoting private concessions as a means to finance 
highways. Instead, the government opted for modernizing the Spanish 
road network by widening and upgrading the most important roads. 
This new program was completely funded by the public sector.
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Spain has a long tradition of encouraging toll highways by granting 
concessions to private companies. Concessions in Spain have been char-
acterized by a willingness to transfer considerable risk to the private 
sector. Traffic demand, acquisition of the right-of-way, and financial 
risk have often been allocated to the private sector. From 1996 to 2011, 
16 toll highway concessions, covering a total distance of 835 km, were 
awarded by the central government of Spain with this approach. Some 
of those highways started their operations just before the economic 
recession began. The recession had negative consequences for Spain’s 
economy. The gross domestic product per capita plummeted, and the 
unemployment rate increased from 9% to 20% of the working popu-
lation in just 2 years. The recession also had severe consequences for 
the economic performance of toll highway concessions. Traffic levels 
declined at a much greater rate than did the gross domestic product. In 
addition, the conditions imposed by the financial markets on borrowers 
became much stricter because of the liquidity crisis. This study analyzes 
the impact that the economic recession ultimately had on the perfor-
mance of toll highway concessions in Spain and the actions that the 
government adopted to avoid the bankruptcy of the concessionaires. It 
was found that the economic recession helped identify some deficiencies 
in how risk had been allocated in Spain. The measures that both Spain 
and the European Union are adopting so as to improve risk allocation 
are discussed.
Since the adoption of the single currency in 1999 and until 2007, 
Spain kept up its steady economic development, which resulted in 
annual average growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) that 
was consistently above the average for the European Union (EU). 
During this period, public infrastructure investment reached the 
highest levels ever seen in the history of Spain. In fact, the ratio of 
public investment to GDP in Spain became one of the highest among 
the EU countries.
One of the key mechanisms that helped advance infrastructure 
investment in Spain was the implementation of different public-
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The third stage began in 1996 and continues up to the present. In 
1996 the conservative People’s Party took office in Spain. The need 
to contain Spain’s public deficit was the most difficult challenge 
facing the new government. This problem was the main reason why 
the new government decided to implement once again the policy 
of offering concessions so as to encourage the participation of the 
private sector in the financing of new transportation infrastructure. 
The Socialist government that took office in 2004 by now shared 
this faith in the concession system, though it promoted fewer toll 
highways than had the People’s Party when it was in power. From 
1996 up to 2011, 835 km of new toll highway concessions was 
awarded by the central government of Spain through this approach.
legal Framework
The legal framework for PPPs in Spain has evolved significantly 
over the years. The first highway concessions were awarded on the 
basis of specific decrees passed by the government. In 1972 the first 
law, called the Toll Highway Law, was passed. The goal of this law 
was to regulate toll highway concession contracts and the public 
guarantees applicable to them.
However, the most important legislation about concession 
contracts in Spain occurred with the approval of the public works 
concession law in 2003. This law was promptly incorporated into 
the framework of the public contract law. One of the law’s objectives 
was to update the old highway concession model and to extend it 
to all types of public works to reinforce the contribution of private 
financing for the construction and maintenance of public facilities 
and to define a new risk-sharing approach (3).
In 2007 a new public contract law was passed in Spain in order 
to transpose new EU legislation concerning public contracts to the 
Spanish legal framework. This new law basically maintained the legal 
framework set up in 2003 regarding concession contracts, though 
some slight modifications were incorporated.
Main Features of Concession Contracts
Toll highway concessions in Spain have retained most of their distinc-
tive features throughout the years, even though there are some differ-
ences between the concessions awarded in the first period and those 
awarded in the third period. Procurement of highway concessions 
in Spain has been done largely on the basis of an “open procedure.” 
This procedure means that any company that fulfils the minimum 
requirements as set out by the government in the contract’s provi-
sions is allowed to participate in the tendering process. Unlike other 
long-term infrastructure contracts in the world (e.g., design–build–
finance–operate contracts in the United Kingdom and most of the 
PPP contracts in Germany), concession contracts in Spain were not 
agreed on in negotiations between the government and the bidders. 
Rather, the government submits standard contracts to the bidders 
through the bidding terms it sets that eventually will have to be 
accepted by all the concessionaires. The bidders are not allowed 
to introduce additional clauses to clarify specific events that might 
eventually happen.
The concession contracts in Spain are consequently rather 
incomplete since they are not negotiated for each project. However, 
transaction costs for both bidders and the government are very low in 
Spain as compared with other countries (4). This feature is probably 
the most important reason why the number of bidders participating 
in the tendering processes for highway concessions in Spain is often 
quite large (1).
Another feature of concession tenders in Spain is that although 
the government requires the bidders to submit a business plan in their 
offers, the government does not require that they reach a financial 
close before the contract is awarded.
For toll highways, maximum toll levels are set up in the contract 
for each of the preestablished vehicle categories. According to the 
contract, the tolls are updated every year to bring them into line 
with inflation. The contracts permit the concessionaires a certain 
flexibility in reducing the tolls outside of the peak hours.
Another innovation recently introduced in Spain is the so-called 
“progress clause.” This clause consists of requiring the conces-
sionaire to maintain and operate the public works according to the 
technical, environmental, and safety regulations that are currently 
in force and applicable. The aim of this clause is to guarantee that 
the concessionaire is going to adequately maintain and operate the 
highway throughout the years. For instance, if a new regulation 
varies the standards of the safety barriers, the concessionaire has the 
obligation to upgrade the barriers according to the new standards at 
its own cost. Since the implementation of this clause in 2003, the 
technological risk has been transferred to the private sector.
Risk alloCaTion in ConCessions
general principles
Risk in concession contracts reflects the inability of the stakeholders 
to know in advance the change in the variables that determines the 
value of the concession business throughout the life of the contract. 
As pointed out by Pinglo et al., concession contracts are regarded 
by the private sector as an attractive but highly risky business (5). 
Concession contracts are also risky for the government in that public 
guarantees by the government are provided.
Toll motorway concessions undergo several types of risk. These 
risks can be classified in two different ways. According to their rela-
tive influence in the economic balance of the contract, the following 
can be identified: capital cost risk (land acquisition, construction and 
license approval), revenue risk, and maintenance and operation risk. 
According to the nature of the risk, the risks can be classified into three 
types: market risk, unpredictable risk, and legal and political risk (2).
The last classification can be narrowed down into two types of risk: 
global risk and project risk. Global risk is completely unpredictable, 
such as earthquakes, terrorist acts, or changes in the government, 
and is impossible to anticipate at the time the contract is drafted. 
Project risk is those risks, such as construction risk, operation risk, or 
availability risk, that are manageable in a certain way by the project 
operator (6).
There is extensive literature regarding risk allocation in concession 
contracts (7, 8). According to the World Bank, the allocation of risks 
in concession contracts should be made according to two criteria (9): 
(a) the risk should be allocated to the stakeholder best able to manage 
the risk outcome and (b) the risk should be borne by the stakeholder 
best able to handle the risk at the lowest cost. Market risks are usu-
ally allocated to the concessionaire, whereas the government often 
assumes unpredictable political and legislative risks.
Risk allocation has a direct and important bearing on the financial 
cost of the project. When the risks allocated to the concessionaire 
are very high, the financial cost of the project becomes significant 
and can threaten the ultimate financial feasibility of the project. For 
that reason, public guarantees are often provided. These guarantees 
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facilitate the financial feasibility of the project through the allocation 
of greater risk to the government.
An adequate risk allocation profile in PPPs requires striking the 
right balance between risks retained by the public sector and risks 
transferred to the private sector. Too much risk retained by the public 
sector might not encourage the concessionaire to perform properly 
and might end up proving to be too costly for the public budget in 
the future. In its turn, too much risk transferred to the private sector 
might make the project infeasible from the financial standpoint of 
attracting private investors.
Risk allocation Before Financial Crisis
Risk allocation in toll concession contracts in Spain has evolved 
slightly over the years. The first concession contracts awarded in 
Spain allocated most of the market risk to the private sector (both 
concessionaires and financial institutions). In spite of that feature, 
the government granted certain fiscal advantages and financial guar-
antees to the concessionaires in order to attract funding for such 
projects from financial institutions and other investors.
The two oil shocks that the industrialized countries experienced 
in the 1970s had a huge impact on the guarantees provided by the 
Spanish government to highway concessionaires in two ways. First, 
the rise in gas prices caused traffic growth to be lower than expected. 
Second, exchange rates became unusually unstable. These factors 
triggered the guarantees that had been incorporated in the already 
existing contracts, which ultimately became very expensive for the 
government.
Because of the problems mentioned earlier, further legislation 
considerably restricted public guarantees, even though it incorpo-
rated several mechanisms whereby the public sector could eventu-
ally contribute to the financial feasibility of concession contracts. 
The current concession law establishes that the private sector should 
be allocated most of the market risk (3). However, it allows for com-
pensating the concessionaire by changing the economic balance of 
the contract in three circumstances:
•	 When the government imposes additional changes to the original 
contract terms so as to favor the public interest, for example, addi-
tional work required of the concessionaire to improve safety on the 
highways;
•	 When the government carries out actions not foreseen when the 
contract was signed that substantially affect the economics of the con-
tract, for example, a change in the corporate tax rate or the construction 
of competing infrastructure not originally foreseen; and
•	 When circumstances of force majeure (defined by Spanish 
legislation as fire caused by atmospheric electricity, natural phe-
nomena with catastrophic implications, and damage caused by war 
and serious alterations of the public order) lead directly to substantial 
disruption of the financial terms of the concession.
In addition, Spanish law allows, but does not require, the contract-
ing parties to set up a procedure to mitigate risk by setting up minimum 
and maximum thresholds in the terms for any variable related to the 
financial result of the concession (traffic, revenues, and so forth), as 
defined in the bidding terms. Unfortunately, this measure has rarely 
been adopted. The current financial problems of most of the conces-
sions awarded during the third period would not have been that big 
if these mechanisms had been implemented.
Table 1 shows how risks are allocated in toll highway concession 
contracts in Spain compared with the recommendations included in 
a report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) (6). Risk allocation in Spain turns out to be much 
more dependent on the private sector than these recommendations. 
The government bears little risk since the Spanish law states that 
force majeure and policy risks will be covered by changes in the eco-
nomic balance of the concession contract, which does not necessarily 
require contributions from the government.
The most important risk borne by the government in Spain is 
the project default risk. One of the most controversial clauses of the 
Spanish concession law regarding risk allocation is the one that 
determines the compensation to the concessionaire in case of early 
termination of the contract. This clause, which does not exist in the 
United States, establishes that if the contract terminates earlier than 
TABLE 1  Risk Allocation in Toll Highway Concessions Compared with Recommendations from OECD
Risk Category Example Risk Allocation
Partner Likely Well Suited  
to Manage Riska
Force majeure Loss from war and natural disaster Change in economic balance  
of contract
Public 
Regulatory and political risk Project delay, change in law or policy affecting 
revenue 
Change in economic balance  
of contract
Public 
Land acquisition Private
Revenue–demand risk Deficient revenue due to low traffic volume or lower 
price due to demand elasticity
Private Mostly public, some private 
Design–technical risk Engineering or design failure Private Private
Construction risk Cost escalation due to delay or faulty technique Private Private
Operating risk Costly operation and life-cycle  
maintenance
Private Private 
Environmental risk Damage and liability or mitigation cost from adverse 
environmental events
Private Private 
Financial risk 
 
Cost of inadequate revenue hedging and debt  
management 
Private
Subordinated public participation 
loans
Mostly private, some public 
 
Project default risk Project bankruptcy from any or all of the factors above Mostly public Shared public and private
aRecommendations from the OECD.
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it is supposed to—and bankruptcy is one of the causes of such early 
termination of the contract—the government will have to pay com-
pensation to the concessionaire equal to the capital cost declared 
by the concessionaire in its financial plan minus the depreciation of 
the assets calculated according to the accounting norms of Spain. 
Regardless of the principle under which this guarantee is based, the 
fact is that this guarantee may have serious negative consequences 
for the government since the committed payments will immediately 
increase the size of the public deficit of Spain. This clause poses the 
problem that it gives the concessionaire a lot of bargaining power to 
put pressure on the government to renegotiate the concession con-
tract. This clause was not changed when the new law was drafted 
because no alternative was found by the government to mitigate the 
lenders’ risk in case of early termination of the contract.
The financial risk falls primarily on the private sector. Consequently, 
the government does not provide guarantees in case events prompting 
unusual changes in the financial markets eventually occur. Regardless, 
the government can provide subordinated public participation loans 
(SPPLs) to improve the financial feasibility of concession projects (1). 
SPPLs are loans provided by the government that are subordinated 
to senior debt. Consequently, participating loan holders (which is the 
government in the case of SPPLs) will be paid back only after the 
concessionaire has met its obligations to the senior lenders. However, 
the participating loan holders will be paid back before the shareholders 
receive any dividend.
The expected rate of return of SPPLs is related to the performance 
of the concession. In other words, the better the outcome of the 
concession—in terms of traffic, sales, revenues, or whatever other 
variable may be specified in the contract—the greater the rate of return 
of the SPPLs. The idea behind this approach is that the government 
shares the profits and losses of the project with the concessionaire.
iMpaCT oF eConoMiC ReCession  
on HigHway ConCessions
Causes and Consequences of Recession
The economic recession in Spain has been caused by both exogenous 
and endogenous factors. The most important exogenous causes are the 
price rise of raw materials (such as copper and oil) and the influence 
of the global financial crisis. The endogenous causes are also two: 
the real estate bubble that damaged the financial system because 
of the great exposure of the Spanish banks to mortgages and the 
limited capacity of Spain to respond to the crisis because of the low 
productivity of the Spanish workforce, the lack of flexibility in the 
labor market, and a high level of indebtedness in both the public and 
the private sectors (10).
The impact of the economic crisis in Spain has been one of the most 
severe among the European countries. The country was in recession 
for seven straight quarters, which was reflected in negative GDP 
growth in both 2009 and 2010. This impact provoked an accelerated 
increase in the unemployment rate, which in 2010 surpassed 20%, 
the highest among the first 15 countries to join the European Union 
(EU-15). In this same year Germany and France, by contrast, had 
unemployment rates of 7% and 9.7%, respectively.
Figure 1 shows the evolution over time of some key macro-
economic indicators comparing Spain with the EU-15. It can be 
seen how the recession struck Spain much more sharply than it did 
the rest of the EU-15 in terms of reduction of GDP growth and the 
growth of the unemployment rate.
A report prepared by the Bank of Spain (11) claimed that the 
recovery of Spain will be slow and strongly dependent on the evolu-
tion of the broader European economy. Estimates for 2011 forecast 
a GDP growth of around 1% accompanied by an inflation rate of 
more than 2.5%. These forecasts seem to indicate that the crisis 
will take much longer to end than originally forecast. Moreover, in 
2011 the EU had set up higher interest rates for the euro than the 
Spanish economy needed.
impacts on Toll Highway Concessions
The economic recession has affected toll highway concession con-
tracts in Spain in two ways: first, a substantial reduction of real traffic 
levels compared with the expected levels and second, a substantial 
tightening of the requirements demanded by financial institutions if 
they are to grant loans.
Impact on Real Traffic Levels
Table 2 shows yearly traffic growth in the toll highway concessions 
awarded from 1996 on as compared with the annual GDP growth in 
Spain. From the analysis of Table 2, it can be appreciated how traffic 
growth before the onset of the economic recession was for almost 
(a) (b)
FIGURE 1  Evolution of (a) real GDP growth and (b) unemployment rate.
TABLE 2  Traffic Growth in Toll Concessions Compared with GDP Growth
1st Year of Operation, 2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010
Toll Highway
First Year of 
Operation
Real GDP 
Growth (%)
Traffic 
Growth 
(%)
Real GDP 
Growth 
(%)
Traffic 
Growth 
(%)
Real GDP 
Growth 
(%)
Traffic 
Growth 
(%)
Real GDP 
Growth 
(%)
Traffic 
Growth 
(%)
Málaga–Estepona–Guadiaro 1999 3.73 6.40 0.9 −5.95 −3.7 −8.19 −0.1 −3.7
Alicante–Cartagena 2001 3.41 9.70 0.9 −8.75 −3.7 −8.93 −0.1 1.5
Ávila–Villacastín 2002 3.38 6.50 0.9 −1.24 −3.7 17.28 −0.1 −0.85
Santiago–Alto de Santo Domingo 2003 3.52 13.50 0.9 3.65 −3.7 3.2 −0.1 5.01
Segovia–El Espinar 2003 3.52 5.90 0.9 −3.24 −3.7 5.82 −0.1 4.11
León–Astorga 2003 3.52 2.60 0.9 4.37 −3.7 −4.34 −0.1 −4
R-2 Madrid–Guadalajara 2003 3.52 8.80 0.9 −3.99 −3.7 −11.48 −0.1 −1.06
R-3 Madrid–Arganda 2004 3.62 15.00 0.9 −4.19 −3.7 −4.54 −0.1 −5.18
R-5 Madrid–Navalcarnero 2004 3.62 3.70 0.9 −4.46 −3.7 −5.89 −0.1 −2.78
R-4 Madrid–Ocaña 2004 3.62 22.00 0.9 −8.32 −3.7 −15.06 −0.1 −8.37
Eje aeropuerto 2005 3.73 39.68 0.9 0.78 −3.7 −2.6 −0.1 −1.09
Ocaña–La Roda 2006 3.79 8.20 0.9 2.67 −3.7 −3.31 −0.1 −10.48
Madrid–Toledo 2006 3.79 −0.10 0.9 −13.32 −3.7 −21.57 −0.1 −17.1
Cartagena–Vera 2007 3.6 — 0.9 2.88 −3.7 −13.15 −0.1 3.58
Circunvalación de Alicante 2007 3.6  — 0.9 7.16 −3.7 −20.07 −0.1 −9.13
Note: Toll highways competing with free highways are shown in bold italics; — = not applicable. 
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all the concessions much higher than the average GDP growth. This 
growth may be caused by what is called the “ramp-up” effect (12). 
This effect means that during the first few years after new infra-
structure is opened, it has fewer users than it would have had if 
the users were accustomed to the existence of the infrastructure. 
This effect happens because users need a certain period of time to 
familiarize themselves with the existence of new infrastructure and 
its effect within the transportation network.
However, the trend just described changed, and reversed, when 
the economic recession began. Most of the concessions experienced 
traffic reductions much greater than the GDP reduction. This effect 
can be termed the “clamp-down effect.” The effect of the crisis was 
particularly devastating on the toll highways competing with the 
free highways (shown in bold italics in Table 2). Most of these toll 
highways are located in urban areas.
The overall consequence of the changes in traffic levels is that 
greenfield toll concessions tend to improve their performance over 
the years if the economy grows positively. However, most of the toll 
concessions awarded in Spain since 1996 have had to deal with the 
effects of the economic recession during the ramp-up period, the very 
period when the greatest traffic growth would be expected.
The traffic revenue issue was made worse in some concessions that 
compete with free highways because of the high cost overruns in the 
initial acquisition of the right-of-way. In the case of some of the toll 
highways giving access to Madrid City (Radial 2, Radial 3, Radial 4, 
and Radial 5), the concessionaire believed that the value of the land 
necessary to build them was going to be similar to the cost for rural 
properties. However, the landowners appealed to the court of justice, 
and that court eventually resolved matters in favor of the landowners, 
concluding that the land acquired was located close to the city and 
that the construction of a new highway raised the value of the land 
nearby to a greater extent than previously had been assumed by the 
private parties involved in the concession (13).
Impact of Requirements by Financial Institutions
Most concession contracts are funded on the project finance basis 
whereby a special purpose vehicle is created by the sponsors to 
manage the project. Overall, around 10% of private-sector infra-
structure investment uses this means of project finance, including 
PPPs (14). The special purpose vehicle will be funded by equity 
provided by the sponsors and nonrecourse debt provided by financial 
institutions or capital markets. Most of the debt to fund toll highways 
in Spain comes from Spanish banks for several reasons. First, unlike 
the United States, capital markets for project finance deals are not 
well developed in Spain. Second, commercial banks in Spain have 
historically been financially strong and are familiar with concession 
contracts (15).
After the beginning of the world financial crisis, which came right 
after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008, Spanish banks 
were affected by the global liquidity crisis, so they became much 
more restrictive in the loans they provided to highway concessions. 
Greenfield projects with full traffic risk allocation to the concession-
aire were no longer eligible for funding without substantial traffic risk 
mitigation mechanisms, such as flexible term concession or minimum 
income guarantees (16, 17), being put in place.
Brownfield projects with a long traffic track record and green-
field projects whose revenues come from availability payments 
were eligible to be funded by the banks with much stricter require-
ments than before: much greater spreads (from 150 basis points up 
to 375 basis points), shorter terms (from 25 years down to 7 years), 
and higher annual debt service coverage ratios (from 1.2 up to 1.5). 
The impact of the financial recession on the financial cost of highway 
concessions was enormous.
In addition, banks were no longer willing to provide long-term 
financing. The debt was provided on the basis of “mini perm” loans 
with cash sweep guarantee. Mini perms are loans no longer than 
7 years, and they have to be refunded once the project has been com-
pleted and can therefore start generating income. Consequently, 
the sponsors run the risk of having to refund the special purpose 
vehicle once the work has been finished.
As was mentioned earlier, toll highway concessions in Spain are 
awarded on the basis of an open procedure, which does not require 
the bidders to reach the financial close before the contract has been 
awarded. This procedure has the advantage that it is easy for a 
selected concessionaire to seek the lowest financial cost in the mar-
ket after being awarded the concession. However, not requiring a 
financial close in the tender has the disadvantage that no lender 
actually conducts due diligence of the proposal, so bids are likely 
to end up being more optimistic. Some of the concessions in Spain 
were awarded right after the financial recession began, so the con-
cessionaires negotiated the financial contracts with banks imposing 
much stricter conditions than they had before or than the concession-
aires had assumed would be the case. This situation damaged even 
more the economic attractiveness of some of the concession projects.
Consequences for government
The poor economic performance of some concessions, as described 
earlier, especially that of the suburban toll highway concessions 
around Madrid, moved the government to adopt some measures 
to help the concessionaires make their businesses viable. The con-
cessions affected by such mitigation were those for which traffic 
overestimation turned out to be particularly high and cost overruns 
caused by land expropriation became onerous for the concessionaires 
to bear.
The government approved a set of measures in order to mitigate the 
effects of the recession. The measure adopted by the government was 
the award of SPPLs to the concessionaires, which the concessionaires 
will have to pay back to the government in the future.
However, the economic prospects of the concessions were so poor 
that the award of SPPLs alone to the concessionaires was not enough 
to make the expected yield of the SPPLs viable. In order to solve 
this problem, the government changed the contract terms of two 
of the concessions. The Radial 2 concession—a suburban toll highway 
that was created to alleviate congestion into and out of Madrid City—
was extended by 14 years and the tolls allowed to be charged by 
the concessionaire were increased above the levels originally estab-
lished in the contract. The holder of the concession, which included 
both Radial 3 and Radial 5—also suburban toll highways in the 
metropolitan area of Madrid—was also authorized to raise the tolls 
over the values originally set up in the contract terms.
The aim of changing the original contract terms was to guarantee 
that the project will be able to pay back the SPPLs provided by the 
government. This measure has been implemented as well in the 
Alicante–Cartagena concession. The contract terms of the Málaga–
Alto de Las Pedrizas concession, which is still in the construction 
phase, have also been changed by the government through a 17-month 
extension of the concession’s length and through permitting a rise 
in the tolls above what was originally established in the contract.
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In addition, at the end of 2010 the Parliament approved a law in 
order to guarantee to the concessions that were not performing well 
the difference between the 80% of the revenues originally expected 
and the revenues actually collected for a period of 3 years. The rev-
enues of most of the toll concessions hover around 50% and 70% of 
the original estimates. The funds provided by the government are 
actually SPPLs since they are supposed to be paid back to the gov-
ernment with an interest rate equivalent to the one applied in other 
SPPLs. In 2011 the government disbursed up to €80.1 million to 
compensate the concessions whose operations began in 2004 or 
later and consequently have been particularly harmed by the drop 
in traffic following the recession.
new ConCepTion oF Risk alloCaTion  
in ConCessions
The case of toll highway concessions in Spain demonstrates the 
vulnerability of long-term contracts to unexpected changes in the 
evolution of the economy. It also demonstrates that, contrary to earlier 
expectations, transferring most of the risk to the private sector may 
end up being even worse for the government than if the government 
had originally retained those risks.
This situation does not mean that PPPs are not a good way of pro-
viding for building and maintaining highway infrastructure, but it 
might mean that the government should play a more important role 
in mitigating risk in order to foster the financial viability of projects 
that are good for society. Europe and Spain specifically are moving 
in this direction. Two initiatives are described, which are already being 
studied, for creating a better risk-sharing approach in PPPs: the OASIS 
research project and the infrastructure bond initiative promoted by the 
European Commission.
new Framework
The Ministry of Research and Development of the government of 
Spain entrusted to a consortium made up of universities and com-
panies involved in the highway business the definition of a new 
framework for highway concessions in Spain. The project, OASIS, 
is still ongoing. However, some of the proposals derived from this 
project have already been announced (18).
The project sets up a new institutional framework for highway 
concessions in Spain. It establishes that the trunk network will be 
managed through concession contracts with private companies. The 
concessions will be awarded competitively. The concessionaires 
will be paid a monthly or a yearly fee related to a set of performance-
based indicators such as the state of the pavement, safety, quality of 
service, and so on.
The government will implement tolls over the trunk network for 
all types of vehicles. The tolls will be set periodically by the govern-
ment according to such criteria as the type of road, the time of the day, 
the congestion level, the type of vehicle, the emission category of the 
vehicle, and so on. Tolls will be collected by a public agency directly 
or through a private contractor on its behalf. The money collected 
will go into an infrastructure fund administered by the government. 
The resources of this fund will be used to pay the fees to the con-
cessionaires, cover the expenses stemming from the implementation 
of an electronic toll collection system, and promote transport poli-
cies aimed at improving safety and promoting cleaner—that is, less 
polluting—vehicles.
This approach means that traffic risk will no longer be totally borne 
by the concessionaires but rather will be substantially borne by the 
government. The government has some advantages over individual 
concessionaires in the management of traffic risk. First, it man-
ages a large portfolio of highways; gains and losses from different 
road stretches can help to balance out the overall picture. Second, the 
government has greater flexibility to manage toll rates so as to avoid 
deficits, or, in case of a deficit, it can provide subsidies to the system 
if that were determined to be the best option. Removing traffic risk 
from the concessionaire’s side also has some problems as long as the 
concessionaire’s incentive to attract traffic can be substantially reduced.
The main advantage of this approach is that concession contracts 
and their inherent advantages—such as efficiencies from the conces-
sionaire’s applying a life-cycle cost perspective and higher quality 
requirements—are reinforced, whereas traffic and enforcement risks 
are reallocated to the public sector. Another advantage is that tolls are 
established in a similar way all over the network so that some sections 
of the network—the ones with the heaviest traffic—will in effect be 
subsidizing those that have the lightest traffic, thereby spreading, and 
minimizing, the overall risk.
infrastructure Bond initiative
Another interesting initiative that is being promoted by the EU to 
facilitate debt financing of relevant infrastructure projects is the 
so-called Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative (19). The Europe 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth intends, among 
other proposals, to foster the participation of private capital in the 
financing of public infrastructure. This initiative is especially impor-
tant given the huge amount of infrastructure investment required 
and the great pressures on government budgets in Europe.
The initiative will be launched by the Commission of the EU 
together with the European Investment Bank (EIB). The idea behind 
the Project Bond Initiative is to provide EU support to project com-
panies issuing bonds to finance large-scale infrastructure projects. 
The initiative would be available to those projects that are judged to 
be economically and technically sound and cost-effective and that 
have a real prospect of financial viability.
Infrastructure bonds issued in the EU have rarely proved attractive 
to a broad investor base. The only way to make these bonds appeal-
ing to the financial markets had been to offer them along with the 
guarantee of monoline insurance. However, with the demise of 
the monoline industry, such issuance effectively came to an end.
The Project Bond Initiative intends to provide credit enhancement 
in order to promote the issuance of bonds. This enhancement could 
take the form of either a debt service guarantee or an additional layer 
of subordinated debt. The choice of a guarantee or a loan would 
depend on the precise financial characteristics of each project, but 
neither would serve as a substitute for shareholder contributions 
in the form of equity or shareholder loans. The initiative sets up a 
maximum limit for the guarantee or subordinated debt eligible to be 
provided. Either the guarantee or the subordinated debt will never 
exceed 20% of the senior debt of the project.
The initiative would absorb much of the risk that insufficient cash 
would be available to service the senior debt, thereby raising its credit 
rating. This feature will enable senior project debt to be issued in the 
capital markets in the form of a new class of project bonds, result-
ing in reduced funding costs for longer maturities for project entities 
while at the same time meeting the demand of institutional investors 
(such as pension funds and life insurance companies) for stable, 
long-term assets.
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The debt service guarantee could be in the form of a contingent 
credit line provided to the project entity by the EIB (or another financ-
ing partner), which would inject funds into the entity if the project 
were unable to generate sufficient cash in the short to medium term 
to service its debt for any reason. Once drawn, the facility would 
be subordinated to the project bonds. The project bonds would be 
repaid first. Any funds left over would be used to repay the facility 
through a subordinated cash sweep mechanism.
Alternatively, an EIB subordinated loan of sufficient size could be 
provided to the project entity, with the same effect as the guarantee 
just described of increasing the cash flow available to cover the senior 
project bonds in order to achieve the necessary investment-grade 
rating required by institutional investors. This second approach 
resembles the U.S. Transportation Infrastructure Finance Act of 
1998 (20).
The EIB will be entrusted with performing the required due 
diligence and financial appraisal in the structuring phase. This insti-
tution will also price the guarantee or loan and thereafter monitor 
the project. The EU and the EIB will share the risk of the losses 
of the project portfolio. The risk-taking by the EU and the EIB would 
be compensated through a risk premium charged up front to the 
project entity at the time the agreement over the exact terms of the 
guarantee is concluded.
ConClusions
It was shown how the economic recession and financial crisis that 
started in 2008 have helped identify some of the deficiencies of 
highway concessions in Spain related to the way risks are allocated. 
Moreover, the consequences of the economic recession for the 
performance of toll highways proved that transferring too much risk 
to private promoters may end up, paradoxically, being worse for 
the government than if it had always retained part of the risk. This 
situation happens because when concessions start having problems, 
the government usually prefers to bail out the concessions to keep 
them alive rather than allow them to fail and force the government 
to take over. This occurs even though no legal provision obliges the 
government to act in this way and to rescue the concessionaires.
From this analysis it is concluded that the economic recession 
has helped Spain and the EU to be aware of the necessity to change 
the way risks are being allocated in toll highway concessions. The 
economic recession has caused those concerned with highway con-
cession contracts to learn three lessons. First, past experience has 
demonstrated that allocating the bulk of traffic risk to the conces-
sionaires does not work well, particularly for greenfield projects. 
To solve this problem, new models, which unlink revenue genera-
tion in the highway network from fees paid to the concessionaires, are 
being studied. Second, sudden changes in financial market conditions 
have demonstrated that the financial close of the project should not 
be unduly delayed. To solve this problem, the implementation of a 
deadline in concession contracts to reach the financial close of the 
project seems to be a good alternative. And third, the severe economic 
recession has demonstrated the weaknesses of the financial markets in 
providing long-term financing to megaprojects. To solve this problem, 
in the future the public sector will have to play a more important role 
through subordinated debt or financial guarantees to the projects.
With the framework proposed in the OASIS project, the con-
sequences for the concessionaires of the economic recession would 
not have been so devastating because their revenues would have been 
mostly availability based. The approach would have increased the risk 
for the government in a certain way because revenues would have 
decreased. However, the government might have managed this risk 
by postponing future highway developments and using the revenues 
obtained for paying the commitments with the present concessionaires.
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